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Abstract
We study a retail market where firms compete in shopping hours and prices,
and consumers have night-time or day-time preferences. In contrast to the ex-
isting literature we introduce a market expansion effect of extending shopping
hours by adding a segment of consumers (the loyal consumers) whose demand is
increased if shopping hours are extended. We find that prices can increase due
to deregulation so that some consumers are worse off with deregulation. We also
find that the extent of the price increase depends on the competitiveness of the
retail industry.
JEL Numbers: D21; L51; L22.
Keywords: Deregulation; Shopping Hours; Product Differentiation; Loyalty.
*We would like to thank Morten Hviid and Alexander Rasch as well as two anonymous referees for
helpful comments and discussions. We are also thankful to the audience at the Competition Authority
of the Basque Country, Spain.
†School of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, United Kingdom. Email:
m.floressandoval@surrey.ac.uk.
‡Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom.
Email: t.wenzel@bath.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
Despite a trend towards shopping hours deregulation in recent years opening hours
in European countries and Australia are more restricted than in the United States or
Canada. Within Europe and Australia the issue of whether to restrict retailers’ open-
ing hours – in particular trading hours during the weekend and public holidays – is
still controversial. For instance, while Italy has introduced opening hours deregula-
tion for shops, cafés and restaurants, in France Sephora’s flagship Champs Élysées
cosmetics store has been ordered by a French appeals court to close at 9 pm at the
latest.
One of the main concerns of shopping hours liberalisation is how deregulation may
affect the structure and competitiveness of the retail industry. Early empirical studies
show that shopping hours deregulation can lead to a redistribution of market sales
from small to large stores (Morrison and Newman, 1983), and increase the prices
charged by large stores (Tanguay et al., 1995). On the theoretical side, recent studies
(Inderst and Irmen, 2005; Shy and Stenbacka, 2008; Wenzel, 2011; Flores, 2015) find
that prices are the same when retailers are open (and closed) for the same time period
(symmetric opening hours) and prices can increase when one retailer opens longer
hours than its rival (asymmetric opening hours).1
Existing papers typically assume that the total market demand is invariant to
the level of shopping hours. The implication of this assumption is that equilibrium
prices in any symmetric equilibrium are identical (e.g., Shy and Stenbacka, 2008) and
deregulation has no effects on prices. This paper reconsiders the effects of shopping
hours deregulation when extended shopping hours generate a market expansion effect.
To do so we introduce a loyal segment of consumers whose demand increases in the
length of shopping hours.2 In contrast, previous papers study retail market competi-
tion with opening hours and prices for only one type of consumers – shoppers – who
differ in their preferred shopping hours (day-time and night-time). Besides generat-
ing a demand effect, studying the implications of different consumer segments is also
relevant in its own right. In retail market competition segmentation is necessary and
1Prices can increase in the asymmetric case because opening hours deregulation allows retailers to
differentiate opening time in such a way to segment the market and soften price competition.
2We explored the robustness of our results by considering an alternative market expan-
sion effect in a reduced-form version of product differentiation following Singh and Vives
(1984) and found that the qualitative results are similar. This is discussed in Section 5.
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often critical to the development of effective marketing strategies because customers
exhibit heterogeneous preferences and purchase patterns. Retailers indeed face dif-
ferent kinds of consumers (for instance, loyal, shoppers/discount, impulse customers),
of which customer loyalty has been a major focus of the retail literature (e.g., Noble
et al., 2006; McMullan and Gilmore, 2008; Yavas and Babakus, 2009). The importance
of identifying customer segments has been extensively addressed in the marketing lit-
erature (e.g., Steenkamp and Wedel, 1991; Sharma and Levy, 1995; Kara and Kaynak,
1997), and the literature on market competition with heterogeneous consumers (e.g.,
Roy, 2000) has shown the importance of customer segmentation to increase firms’ prof-
its. Therefore, heterogeneity in consumers plays an important role in the retail mar-
ket competition, which has been overlooked in the analysis of the strategic aspects of
shopping hours decisions and we aim to fill with this paper.
The first main result of the paper is that prices in a symmetric duopoly with long
opening hours are higher than prices in a symmetric duopoly with restricted opening
hours. On the one hand, the demand of shoppers is the same under both shopping
hours configurations (restricted and long opening hours) because all shoppers (day-
time and night-time preferences) buy a product from either retailer. On the other
hand, the demand of loyal consumers is higher when firms open longer hours: some
loyal consumers with night-time preference only buy the product if the retailer is open
at their preferred time. Hence, the demand effect of extending shopping hours due to
the segment of loyal consumers induces the price to increase. As a result, deregulation
of shopping hours may lead to higher prices for consumers.
To investigate the potential effects of shopping hours deregulation on welfare we
focus on the symmetric duopoly case. Similarly to Shy and Stenbacka (2008), we com-
pare a regulated market where retailers face opening time restrictions with a dereg-
ulated market where retailers expand their opening hours. We find that some con-
sumer segments (those with a day-time preference) are hurt by deregulation. More-
over, shoppers can be worse off with deregulation, which is the second key result of
the paper. This is the case when the proportion of shoppers to loyal consumers with
day-time preference is relatively high: the demand increase due to loyal consumers
after deregulation imposes a price increase effect on shoppers with day-time prefer-
ence, which compensates the gain in surplus of shoppers with night-time preference.
Although shoppers can be worse off the gain in surplus of loyal consumers outweighs
such potential loss; therefore total consumer surplus increases with shopping hours
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deregulation.
This paper contributes to the public debate in many European countries about the
potential impact of shopping hours deregulation by providing a better understanding
of the effect of such deregulation on prices and different types of consumers, in par-
ticular by showing that prices may increase and that some consumer segments can
be worse off when firms expand their opening hours. This is in contrast to existing
studies where prices do no change with deregulation when all firms choose identical
shopping hours (Inderst and Irmen, 2005; Shy and Stenbacka, 2008).
A further policy implication is that the extent of price increases due to deregulation
may depend on the competitiveness of the retail industry. In an extension of the basic
model, where we measure the competitiveness of the market by the number of firms,
we find that the price-raising effect decreases with the level of competition. In other
words, in very competitive markets the price effect may be rather insignificant, while
it may become pronounced in less competitive markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model, which is
solved in section 3. Section 4 studies the effects of shopping hours deregulation on
consumer surplus and social welfare. Section 5 discusses some extensions of the main
model and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are two retailers (i = 1,2) competing to sell a differentiated good. Both firms
can offer the product at constant marginal costs which, for simplicity, are normalised
to zero.
The two retailers are located at the opposite ends of a unit line (Hotelling, 1929).
Firms decide on the retail price as well as on their shopping hours. The decision on
shopping hours is a discrete one. A retailer can either open only during the day (D) or
open all day (A). The (fixed) operating costs depend on this choice. There is a cost of k
for operating during day (D) and a cost of µk to operate all day (A), where µ> 1. Hence,
the additional cost for extending shopping hours from D to A is ∆k, where ∆= (µ−1).
There are two market segments: loyal consumers and shoppers. Shoppers
are uniformly located on the unit line between the two retailers while the
segment of loyal consumers is located uniformly in the “hinterland” of each
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firm. The relevant comparison for shoppers is between purchasing from
either retailer while the relevant decision for loyal consumers is between
buying from the preferred retailer and not buying at all.3 This modeling ap-
proach captures the observation that consumers differ in brand preferences,
where the shoppers are the segment of consumers with lower brand prefer-
ences, while loyal consumers have strong brand preferences.4 Consumers also
differ in their preferred shopping time. From the group of shoppers, a proportion λ
have day-time preferences, while the remaining 1−λ shoppers have night-time pref-
erences. Similarly, from the group of loyal consumers, a fraction θ have day-time
preferences and the rest 1−θ of loyal consumers have night-time preferences.
The (indirect) utility of a consumer (shopper or loyal) from buying at retailer i with
opening hours Ti is given by:
U = v− tdi − pi −β(T,Ti), (1)
where v is the intrinsic utility derived from the good, pi is the price charged by re-
tailer i, di is the distance between the consumer’s location and the firm’s location, and
t > 0 is the transportation cost parameter. The term β(T,Ti) represents the disutility
of shopping at a time which differs from the consumer’s preferred one. The consumer
suffers a cost of β(T,Ti)=β when she buys at a different time from the preferred one.
Otherwise, the consumer incurs no cost and β(T,Ti)= 0.5,6
We impose the following assumption which ensures that, for any shopping hours
3In principle, loyal consumers in the “hinterland” of a firm i might also purchase from
firm j. However, for reasonable price differences between the firms, this is never optimal
for a consumer. This means that each retailer faces a downward sloping demand of loyal
consumers on each side of the unit interval – the “hinterland” of each retailer. A similar
approach is also considered in Armstrong and Wright (2009).
4A similar approach in a homogenous product market is, for instance, Narasimhan (1988).
5Shy and Stenbacka (2008) focus on the effects of consumers’ shopping time flexibility
by comparing bi-directional consumers with forward or backward-oriented consumers. For
this purpose they assume that consumers are heterogenous in their disutility cost by intro-
ducing a function β(T,Ti)= βmin{T −Ti;1−T} to capture consumers’ disutility of buying the
product at a timing different from the ideal timing. As our focus is on market segmenta-
tion we assume a discrete β- function rather than the more sophisticated function used in
Shy and Stenbacka (2008); however our simplification that all consumers with a night-time
preference incur the same disutility cost does not lead to any qualitatively different results.
6It should be noted that our model is also related to models of multi-dimensional product
differentiation such as Tabuchi (1994) or Irmen and Thisse (1998), but our approach differs
in that consumers face a fixed disutility cost if their preference is not matched along one
dimension (the time dimension). Moreover, in our model due to the segment of loyal con-
sumers, market size is not exogenous, but depends on price and shopping hours.
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configuration, each retailer attracts a positive mass of loyal consumers and that all
shoppers buy the product:
Assumption 1.
v >
7
6
t+
β(3+2θ)
3
.
Finally, the timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage retailers choose their
shopping hours (D or A) and in the second stage retailers compete in prices. As is
usual we solve the game by backward induction.
3 The Equilibrium
3.1 Pricing
Given firms’ opening hours decisions at stage one, firms compete in prices at stage two.
Denote with p1 and p2 the prices charged by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Firms’
demand functions are
D1(p1, p2)=λx
s
D + (1−λ)x
s
N +θx
l
D + (1−θ)x
l
N , (2)
D2(p2, p1)=λ(1− x
s
D)+ (1−λ)(1− x
s
N)+θx
l
D + (1−θ)x
l
N , (3)
where xs
D
and xs
N
are the marginal consumers of the shopper type with day and
night-time preferences, and xl
D
and xl
N
are the marginal consumers of the loyal type
with day and night-time preferences, respectively. The marginal consumers for the
shopper type depend on firms’ opening time (T1 and T2) and prices (p1 and p2). Using
the utility function (1), a shopper type consumer is indifferent between shopping at 1
or 2 if
v− p1− tx−β(T,T1) = v− p2− t(1− x)−β(T,T2). (4)
Then, xs
D
and xs
N
are derived from (4). There are two relevant cases for the shop-
pers. First, if both retailers have identical opening hours (T1 = T2 = D, or T1 = T2 = A),
then xs
D
= xs
N
=
1
2+
p2−p1
2t .
7 The second case is when one firm opens all day and the other
7In this case only transportation costs and prices affect the shoppers’ decision.
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firm opens only during the day. Suppose T1 = A and T2 = D. Then, the marginal con-
sumers are xs
D
=
1
2 +
p2−p1
2t and x
s
N
=
1
2 +
p2−p1+β
2t . (The case where T1 = D and T2 = A is
analogous.)
The demand of the loyal segment depends on a firm’s shopping hours and its price.
A loyal consumer is indifferent between shopping at firm i and not buying the retail
good if
v− pi − tx−β(T,Ti)= 0, (5)
which gives
x =
v− pi −β(T,Ti)
t
. (6)
Given that the marginal consumers of the loyal type depend only on firm i’s opening
times and prices, the relevant cases are when a firm chooses either D or A: if Ti = D,
then xl
D
=
v−pi
t
and xl
N
=
v−pi−β
t
; if Ti = A, then xlD = x
l
N
=
v−pi
t
.
Firm i’s operating profits are
Πi(pi, p j) = pi D i(pi, p j)−K ,
where K = {k,µk}. For given opening hours (T1,T2), the resulting equilibrium prices
and profits are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Equilibrium Prices and Profits
T1 T2 p
∗
1 p
∗
2 Π
∗
1 Π
∗
2
D D 2v+t5 −
2β(1−θ)
5
2v+t
5 −
2β(1−θ)
5
3[2v+t−2β(1−θ)]2
50t −k
3[2v+t−2β(1−θ)]2
50t −k
A A 2v+t5
2v+t
5
3[2v+t]2
50t −µk
3[2v+t]2
50t −µk
A D 2v+t5 +
β(3+2θ−5λ)
35
2v+t
5 −
β(17−12θ−5λ)
35
3[7(2v+t)+β(3+2θ−5λ)]2
2450t −µk
3[7(2v+t)−β(17−12θ−5λ)]2
2450t −k
D A 2v+t5 −
β(17−12θ−5λ)
35
2v+t
5 +
β(3+2θ−5λ)
35
3[7(2v+t)−β(17−12θ−5λ)]2
2450t −k
3[7(2v+t)+β(3+2θ−5λ)]2
2450t −µk
Looking at the equilibrium prices we have the first main result of the paper:
Proposition 1. Prices in a symmetric duopoly with long opening hours are higher than
prices in a symmetric duopoly with restricted opening hours.
From Table 1, the price increase is pAA − pDD = 2β(1−θ)5 > 0, which is clearly posi-
tive. This result is different from existing models (Shy and Stenbacka, 2008; Inderst
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and Irmen, 2005). In those models, in any outcome with symmetric shopping hours,
prices do not change due to deregulation. This is because in their models total market
demand is invariant to changes in shopping hours so that, in any symmetric configura-
tion, equilibrium prices only reflect the degree of product differentiation in the spatial
dimension.
In contrast to the previous literature, in our model there is a demand effect of
extending shopping hours due to the segment of loyal consumers. For given prices, de-
mand of loyal consumers with night-time shopping preference increases with extended
shopping hours. As a result, due to shopping hours deregulation and the increase of
demand, a firm finds it worthwhile to increase its price. This price increase is pro-
portional to the demand increase and, hence, to the share of loyal consumers with
night-time preference (1−θ).
In our model, this price-increasing effect of shopping hours’ deregulation results
from the presence of the loyal market segment. However, we would like to note that
this effect arises more generally when extended shopping hours lead to higher to-
tal market demand. For instance, qualitatively similar results can be derived when
consumers’ demand is increasing in shopping hours in differentiated product market
following Singh and Vives (1984). We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.
3.2 Shopping Hours
In this section we solve for the equilibrium shopping hours (stage one) anticipating
the price competition at stage two. Under shopping hours regulation (benchmark
case) firms can open only during the day (night opening time is prohibited); hence,
the outcome is characterised by the symmetric shopping hours configuration (D,D).
The outcome with shopping hours deregulation (firms are allowed to expand their
opening hours) is either a symmetric configuration, (A,A) or (D,D), or an asymmetric
outcome where one firm opens longer hours than its rival, (A,D) or (D,A). The following
proposition characterises the equilibrium shopping hours.
Proposition 2. Let k =
3β[14(2v+t)−β(17−12θ−5λ)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t and k =
3β[14(2v+t)+β(16θ−5λ−11)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t ,
where k > k. Then,
(a) If ∆k < k, then (T∗1 , T
∗
2 ) = (A, A);
8
(b) If k <∆k < k, then (T∗1 , T
∗
2 ) = (A, D) or (T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 ) = (D, A);
(c) If ∆k > k, then (T∗1 , T
∗
2 ) = (D, D).
Proof: see Appendix.
The structure of equilibrium shopping hours is similar to existing models (Shy and
Stenbacka, 2008; Wenzel, 2011). For low costs of extending shopping hours we have
an equilibrium with both retailers choosing long shopping hours. For intermediate
costs we have an asymmetric outcome where one retailer chooses extended shopping
hours and the other retailer chooses short opening hours. Finally, for high costs both
retailers choose short shopping hours.
4 The Impact of Deregulation
This section analyses the impact of shopping hours deregulation on consumer surplus
and social welfare. We follow the approach in Shy and Stenbacka (2008) and focus on
the case where ∆k < k so that deregulation leads to a symmetric outcome with both
retailers extending their shopping hours from D to A. This case is the most interesting
as in the existing literature there is no price effect in any symmetric configuration.
As deregulation leads to a price increase (Proposition 1), this has immediate impli-
cations for consumer surplus, which are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. With shopping hours deregulation:
(a) the surplus of consumers with day-time preference decreases,
(b) the surplus of consumers with night-time preference increases,
(c) the surplus of loyal consumers increases,
(d) the surplus of shoppers consumers either decreases or increases,
(e) total consumer surplus increases.
Proof: see Appendix.
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When shopping hours are liberalised the surplus of consumers with day-time pref-
erence decreases because these consumers pay higher prices and they still buy the
product at their preferred time (no extra surplus in the time dimension). This result is
similar to the monopoly case discussed in Shy and Stenbacka (2008). Proposition 3 (b)
shows that the surplus of consumers with night-time preference increases with dereg-
ulation because this group of customers are willing to pay for being able to buy the
product at their preferred time. Shy and Stenbacka (2008) find that in the monopoly
case only night-time shoppers with ideal shopping time around 3/4 are better off with
deregulation because they do not face any time cost of advancing or postponing their
shopping time. In contrast, our result shows that all night-time consumers are bet-
ter off with deregulation. This result is different because in our setting all night-time
consumers face the same disutility in time while in Shy and Stenbacka (2008) some
night-time consumers can avoid such cost by advancing or postponing their shopping.
Themost interesting finding arises when we compare bothmarket segments (Propo-
sition 3 (c) and (d)): loyal consumers are better off with deregulation while shoppers
can be harmed with deregulation. Indeed, shoppers are worse off when the proportion
of shoppers with day-time preference and the proportion of loyal consumers with night-
time preference are sufficiently high (3/5<λ≤ 1 and 5(1−λ)/2< (1−θ)≤ 1). Intuitively,
the relatively high proportion of loyal consumers with night-time preference imposes
a price increase effect on shoppers with day-time preference which compensates the
gain in surplus of shoppers with night-time preference. Note that the literature on
the strategic aspects of shopping hours shows that shoppers are always better off with
deregulation in a duopolistic framework. This result is due to the fact that those mod-
els consider only one customer segment – shoppers – and prices with deregulation are
the same as with regulation. This is not always the case in our setting with two mar-
ket segments (shoppers and loyal customers) because of the demand effect discussed
in Proposition 1.
Although consumers with day-time preference are worse off with deregulation, the
gain in surplus of those consumers with night-time preference compensates the neg-
ative effect of shopping hours liberalisation. Similarly, the gain in surplus of loyal
consumers outweighs the potential loss in surplus of shoppers. Therefore total con-
sumer surplus increases with shopping hours deregulation (Proposition 3 (e)).
Finally, we briefly comment on the effect of shopping hours deregulation on social
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welfare.8 As in Shy and Stenbacka (2008) we also find that shopping hours are not
excessive and, hence, no reason to regulate shopping hours arises from a social welfare
point of view. Note, however, that the positive effects of shopping hours deregulation
are somewhat lower than in their model as some consumer groups (consumers with a
day-time preference) are hurt by deregulation.
5 Extensions
Before concluding the paper let us discuss briefly three extensions of the main model.
First, we also solved the model considering N firms located equidistantly on a unit
circle (Salop, 1979). The number of firms can be thought of as a measure of the com-
petitiveness of the retail market. As in the Hotelling version we find that prices may
go up with deregulation. In the Salop version of our model this price increase is equal
to β(1−θ)
N+2 , which is positive and decreasing in the number of firms; therefore, the price
increase due to deregulation is smaller in more competitive markets. This finding sug-
gests that the effects of deregulation may depend on the competitiveness structure of
the retail industry: in very competitive markets the price-raising effect of liberalising
shopping hours may be insignificant, but may be of more concern in less competitive
markets.
Second, in the main model we assume that both retailers face the same propor-
tion of loyal consumers with day-time preference (θ). In practice, however, retailers
may have different customers’ type composition. Suppose now that θ1 > θ2. Solving
the game9 we find that the price increasing effect due to deregulation is on average
stronger than in the main model. In addition, we find that the difference in surplus
for shoppers due to deregulation is β(3+θ1+θ2−5λ)5 −
β2(θ1−θ2)2
49t , which is smaller than the
change in surplus for shoppers when θ1 = θ2. This implies that our finding that shop-
pers can be worse off with deregulation (Proposition 3 (d)) is a lower bound: an increase
in (θ1−θ2) enlarges the region where shoppers are worse off with deregulation.
Third, in the main text we introduce market expansion by adding a loyal
segment of consumers. Here, we discuss that the price-increasing effect also
8As it is standard, social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits.
9The equilibrium prices with regulation (D,D) are p1 =
2v+t
5 −
2β(7−6θ1−θ2)
35 and p2 =
2v+t
5 −
2β(7−6θ2−θ1)
35 ,
and the equilibrium prices with shopping hours deregulation (A,A) are p1 = p2 =
2v+t
5 . Note that prices
with regulation are asymmetric (p1 > p2) while prices with deregulation are symmetric and equivalent
to those prices in table 1.
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holds more generally when total demand increases with the length of shop-
ping hours. For concreteness, let us adopt an alternative model of product
differentiation following Singh and Vives (1984). We consider a reduced-form
demand system qi = A − pi + bp j +φ(h), where the effect of market expansion
due to shopping hours deregulation is captured by the term φ(h) which is
strictly increasing in h. One way to think of this reduced-form approach
is that each consumer’s individual demand for retail products is increasing
with the numbers of hours that retailers are opened.
Standard calculations then imply the following equilibrium price charged
by both firms: p∗ = (A+φ(h))/(2− b). As in the base model, extended shopping
hours, as measured by h, are associated with higher prices for consumers.
6 Final Remarks
We have studied the role of loyal consumers with different time preferences in a re-
tail industry where firms compete in opening hours and prices. Our first contribu-
tion is to present a model that captures a demand effect of extending opening hours.
We show that when retailers expand their opening hours there is a demand effect
due to the segment of loyal consumers with night-time preference; as a consequence
prices are higher than the situation in which retailers do not extend their opening
hours. This logic also extends to a reduced-form approach following Singh
and Vives (1984).
The second contribution of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the
potential effects of shopping hours deregulation on different types of consumers. We
show that the impact of shopping hours liberalisation on shopper consumers is am-
biguous. Indeed, shoppers are worse off with deregulation when the proportion of
shoppers to loyal consumers with day-time preference is relatively high. We conclude
by highlighting that although the total consumer surplus increases with shopping
hours deregulation it is important for policy makers to be aware that different con-
sumer groups may be affected differently by deregulation.
12
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For part (a). (t1, t2) = (A, A) is an equilibrium if neither firm has an incentive to deviate
from long shopping hours:
Πi(A,A)>Πi(D,A) if (µ−1)k <
3β[14(2v+t)−β(17−12θ−5λ)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t .
For part (b). (t1, t2) = (A, D) is an equilibrium if firm 1 has no incentive to deviate from
long opening hours and firm 2 has no incentive to expand its opening hours:
Π1(A,D)>Π1(D,D) if (µ−1)k <
3β[14(2v+t)+β(16θ−5λ−11)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t .
Π2(A,D)>Π2(A,A) if (µ−1)k >
3β[14(2v+t)−β(17−12θ−5λ)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t .
For part (c). (t1, t2) = (D, D) is an equilibrium if neither firm has an incentive to expand its
opening hours:
Πi(D,D)>Πi(A,D) if (µ−1)k >
3β[14(2v+t)+β(16θ−5λ−11)](17−12θ−5λ)
2450t .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Part (a). The difference between the surplus of day-time preference consumers with
regulation (D,D) and the surplus of day-time preference consumers with deregulation (A,A),
∆CSdaytype, is:
∆CSdaytype = −λ
2β(1−θ)
5
+θ
4β(1−θ)[t−3v−β(1−θ)]
25t
(7)
(a) If λ
θ
<
2(t−3v−β(1−θ))
5t , then ∆CSdaytype > 0;
(b) If λ
θ
>
2(t−3v−β(1−θ))
5t , then ∆CSdaytype < 0.
Note that the RHS of the condition in (a) requires that v < t3 −
β(1−θ)
3 , which contradicts
Assumption 1. Therefore, condition (a) cannot be satisfied. Hence, ∆CSdaytype < 0.
Part (b). The difference between the surplus of night-time preference consumers with reg-
ulation (D,D) and the surplus of night-time preference consumers with deregulation (A,A),
∆CSnighttype, is:
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∆CSnighttype = (1−λ)
β(3+2θ)
5
+ (1−θ)
β(3+2θ)[6v−2t−β(3+2θ)]
25t
(8)
(a) If (1−λ)(1−θ) >
2t+β(3+2θ)−6v
5t , then ∆CSnighttype > 0;
(b) If (1−λ)(1−θ) <
2t+β(3+2θ)−6v
5t , then ∆CSnighttype < 0.
Note that the RHS of the condition in (b) requires that v < t3 +
β(3+2θ)
6 , which contradicts
Assumption 1. Therefore, ∆CSnighttype > 0.
Part (c). The difference between the surplus of loyal consumers with regulation (D,D) and
the surplus of loyal consumers with deregulation (A,A), ∆CSloyal, is:
∆CSloyal =
β(1−θ)[18v−6t−β(9+16θ)]
25t
(9)
(a) If v > t3 +
β(9+18θ)
18 , then ∆CSloyal > 0;
(b) If v < t3 +
β(9+18θ)
18 , then ∆CSloyal < 0.
The condition in (b) contradicts Assumption 1. Therefore, ∆CSloyal > 0.
Part (d). The difference between the surplus of shopper consumers with regulation (D,D)
and the surplus of shopper consumers with deregulation (A,A), ∆CSshopper, is:
∆CSshopper =
β(3+2θ−5λ)
5
(10)
(a) If either 0<λ≤ 35 or
3
5 <λ< 1 and
5λ−3
2 < θ < 1, then ∆CSshopper > 0;
(b) If 35 <λ< 1 and 0< θ <
5λ−3
2 , then ∆CSshopper < 0.
Part (e). Adding (10) and (9) we have the change in total consumer surplus due to deregu-
lation:
∆CS =
β(3+2θ−5λ)
5
+
β(1−θ)[18v−6t−β(9+16θ)]
25t
(11)
As we discussed in part (d), the first term in the RHS of (11) is negative if 35 < λ < 1 and
0< θ < 5λ−32 , which makes shoppers worse off with deregulation, otherwise shoppers are better
14
off. Assumption 1 implies that the second term in the RHS of (11) is positive. The latter
compensates the potential reduction in surplus due to shoppers; therefore ∆CS > 0.
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